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SUMMARY 
This second essay (Num. I: HM 2, 185-187) argues that 
the historian may be interested in studying priority con- 
troversies but should analyse historical1 y significant 
events rather than award status. 
The status of mathematicians depends partly on their reputed 
innovations, At times an innovation has been defined as a 
result never before known by anyone. Some mathematicians have 
tried to maintain the competitive advantage of secrecy and also 
to claim priority later on the basis of diaries, notes, private 
communications , .or published ciphers. A familiar example is the 
“priority” of Gauss for least squares. Sometimes priority con- 
troversies, often accompanied by charges of plagiarism, have 
played a significant (usually baleful) role in the development 
of mathematics, as did the Newton-Leibniz quarrel. 
Today, it is generally agreed that only printing (or other 
public communication) counts in the competition for status, and 
priority disputes are rare. The sharpness of the “first” concept 
has been blunted by better communication, greater cooperation, 
the recognition that near-simultaneous discovery of equivalent 
results is normal (with credit properly going to all parties), 
and the custom of giving ample credit by joint authorship or 
explicit acknowledgement to all participants in discussions 
leading to a paper. Most mathematicians today consider as bar- 
baric the attitude, attributed to R.L. Moore, that a “real 
mathematician” would rather that a problem remain unsolved than 
share credit for its solution. Nevertheless, whether motivated 
by ambition, the competitive habit, or a desire to be socially 
useful, mathematicians want to find new results. Hence, their 
natural preoccupation with priority questions. Typically, they 
first become interested in history by wanting to know whether 
what they have found is actually new. For them it is quite 
natural to ask “Who did it first?” They may even imagine that 
answering such questions is the main duty of the historian, and 
this notion is reinforced by the large number of “firsts” 
assigned in older histories of mathematics. 
The historian can be helpful to the mathematician in finding 
antecedents of his work, and he should try to convince his 
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colleagues that the old adage “Those who are ignorant of history 
are condemned to repeat it” is as applicable to mathematical 
research as to political activity. But one hopes that mathemat- 
icians and historians will come to realize that “Who did it first?’ 
is the wrong question. 
Detailed knowledge of the history of a few mathematical topics 
leads to the view common to historians that priority questions 
are very elusive, seldom answerable, and of little importance to 
historical understanding. 
To begin with, we can never know who first thought of anything. 
Sometimes documents show that a mathematician (usually one whose 
fame has preserved his papers) anticipated an idea that was later 
published, but we have no way of knowing the unrecorded thoughts 
of others. Such cases reveal much of interest. They indicate 
that an idea was thinkable in the intellectual context prior to 
its publication, that before an idea is recorded it is usually 
“in the air” more or less as it later appears, and so on. But 
they also establish the indeterminacy of the concept of “first 
person to think of it .I’ Hence, the most that we can hope for is 
to find the first extant record of an idea, an apparently solva- 
ble problem because of the finiteness of the literature. 
On closer examination, however, the hope of finding a “first” 
comes to grief because of the historically dynamic character of 
ideas. If we describe a result with sufficient vagueness, there 
seems to be an endless sequence of those who had something within 
the vague specifications. Even plagiarists usually introduce 
innovations ! If we specify the idea or result precisely, it 
turns out that exact duplications seldom occur, so that every 
mathematical event is a “first,” and the priority question 
becomes trivial. 
For example, the classic “Who invented the calculus?” is 
vague enough to carry us back to antiquity and forward to the 
present century. The usual answer, Newton and Leibniz, is mis- 
leading at best, false if interpreted literally. They were 
nearly independent of each other but heavily dependent on their 
predecessors. They did not “invent” quite the same thing nor 
what we now call calculus. Similar remarks apply to the tradi- 
tional claim that Descartes invented analytic geometry. On the 
other hand we can say with some assurance that Leibniz invented 
the elongated S symbol for the integral, but what difference 
would it make to our view of the development of mathematics if 
we were to discover that it was suggested to him by someone else? 
As another example, consider the so-called “fundamental theorem 
of algebra” -- we say “so-called” because there are many theorems 
(all more or less about the existence of solutions of algebraic 
equations) that go under that name. It is often said that Gauss 
gave the “first rigorous proof .I’ In fact, his proof was not 
rigorous in modern terms, and what he proved was not the same as 
the theorems of his precursors nor of today’s textbooks. We 
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can say that Gauss analyzed previous work on the question, pointed 
out some errors, and gave the most thorough treatment of his day. 
There seems to be an indeterminacy principle on priority. We 
gain determinacy on who was first only by narrowing the specifica- 
tion of the event. With sufficient definition, we find a single 
person responsible (occasionally a group of independent produ- 
cers), but at this level of specificity nearly everything is a 
“first.” The answer to the usual priority question turns out 
to be a chronology of related results. 
But suppose we do find a priority question that can be 
answered? Suppose we established that Leibniz did plagiarize 
Newton or vice versa? What diference would it make to our 
understanding of the development of calculus? We might revise 
our judgement of the morals of Leibniz, but not of his genius, 
because the basic ideas underlying the calculus were present in 
many minds and publications of the day. ‘:The calculus” was not 
a single idea that someone could steal. The contributions of 
Leibniz to the notation and algorithms of calculus and their use 
by him and his collaborators are the important things for under- 
standing his role. 
Of course, I do not mean that who did what and when is of no 
importance. On the contrary, such is the essential raw material 
of history. Rather, I am urging that this raw material is mis- 
represented by converting it into a sequence of first discoveries 
of results known today. Each person was the first to do pre- 
cisely what he did when he did. The historian’s job is to find 
out, relate, and explain these distinct events. Duplication of 
results at much later times, multiple independent “simultaneous” 
discoveries, plagiarism, priority controversies and other status 
struggles are all possible subjects of study. But the historian 
misses his calling if he ahistorically assumes the role of 
arbiter in status contests, whether historic or imagined. He 
is likely to avoid a wild goose chase only by settling for a 
trivial gosling. Even a success would be negligible -- final 
only until another chaser looks at the matter more closely. 
True, priority chasing is only a minor vice. It may even 
stimulate the establishment of better chronology, upon which 
more important historical conclusions might be based. But it 
remains a vice, giving a false picture of the historical process 
and distracting the researcher from analysis of the complex 
evolution of mathematical activity. 
